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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner, :
v.

:

FRANK GENE POWELL,

:

Case No.

Category No. 13

Defendant-Respondent. :
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole question presented for review is whether the
court of appeals erroneously held that State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), adopted a "strict compliance" with rule 11(5),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, test which supersedes the
"record as a whole" test traditionally applied on review to
determine whether a guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered.
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on October
24, 1990, and appears in State v. Powell, No. 900202-CA (Utah Ct.
App. Oct. 24, 1990) (unpublished) (a copy of the court's opinion
is contained in the addendum).
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 11, 1987 defendant was charged with second
degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990) (R. 19). On May 20, 1988, an amended
information was filed charging defendant with manslaughter, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205
(1990) (R. 81). On the same day defendant pleaded guilty to that
charge (R. 186). Defendant was sentenced to serve an
undetermined term of not less than one year or more than 15 years
at the Utah State Prison (R. 100-02).
On September 29, 1989, defendant filed a motion to
withdraw his plea (R. 104). A hearing on defendant's motion was
held on November 3, 1989. The trial court issued a memorandum
decision denying defendant's motion on March 30, 1990 (R. 16878).

Defendant filed his notice of appeal on April 4, 1990 (R.

179).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 20, 1988, defendant entered a guilty plea to the
charge of manslaughter, a second degree felony in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990).

At the hearing on defendant's

guilty plea the trial judge asked defendant his educational level
and ability to read and speak the English language (R. 183);
whether defendant was being treated for any mental illness or was
under the influence of drugs or alcohol (R. 184); whether
defendant understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by
pleading guilty (R. 184); whether he understood the contents of
the affidavit explaining his rights that he had reviewed with his

attorney (R. 184); whether anyone had used any force, duress or
coercion against him (R. 184); and whether defendant considered
the statement of facts concerning the events giving rise to the
death in question, as recounted by the county attorney, to be
true and accurate (R. 185). After defendant answered the
questions to the trial court's satisfaction, defendant was
permitted to sign the affidavit, and the court accepted his plea
of guilty (R. 184-5).

The court stated that the plea was a

result of a plea agreement and that the court had discussed the
agreement and its circumstances with the county attorney (R. 18586).
On September 29, 1989, defendant filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. At the plea hearing defendant
testified that he did not realize that, by pleading guilty, he
was giving up his right to trial, to testify and to hear
witnesses against him (R. 192-94).

Defendant also testified that

he believed he would serve no more than 18 months in prison as a
result of his plea (195-96).

Defendant's trial counsel also

testified concerning the taking of defendant's plea.

He noted

that he was aware of defendant's limited educational background
and difficulty in understanding the legal concepts involved in a
guilty plea (R. 204). As a consequence, trial counsel
extensively reviewed and, at times, paraphrased the affidavits
defendant was to sign in conjunction with his plea. (R. 205-06,
208-18).

Included in the review was a discussion concerning

defendant's sentence, counsel's assessment of the time he thought
defendant would spend in prison, and the trial court's absolute

prerogative in imposing sentence (R. 212-14).

Trial counsel

firmly believed that defendant understood exactly the rights he
was waiving and the penalties that attached to a plea (R. 208).
In denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, the trial court, applying the "record on a whole" standard,
found that defendant's motive for moving to withdraw the plea was
"buyer's remorse" resulting from his failure to gain parole in 18
months (R. 177). He concluded that defendant understood his
guilty plea and its consequences (Ld.).
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT
STATE V. GIBBONS, 740 P.2D 1309 (UTAH 1987),
ADOPTED A TEST OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE
11(5), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
WHICH SUPERSEDES THE "RECORD AS A WHOLE" TEST
TRADITIONALLY APPLIED ON REVIEW TO DETERMINE
WHETHER A GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.
On appeal to the court of appeals, defendant claimed
that he did not fully understand the effects of his plea and the
various constitutional and statutory rights he was waiving.
However, defendant did not specify what "effects" he did not
understand or what constitutional and statutory rights he did not
know he was waiving.

Instead, defendant relied upon an on-the-

record "strict compliance" with rule 11 argument to urge reversal
of the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.

The State responded that, under the "record as a whole"

test traditionally applied by this Court on post-conviction
review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea, the record clearly
supported the trial court's denial of defendant's motion. See,
e.g., Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,

110 S.Ct. 751 (1990); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah
1988); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam).
In reversing and remanding to allow defendant to withdraw
his guilty plea, the court of appeals rejected the State's
argument, continuing to conclude that this Court in State v,
Gibbons replaced the "record as a whole" test with a strict rule
11 compliance test.

Powell, Case No. 900202-CA at 2.

The court

of appeals decision misconstrues Gibbons and ignores significant
language in both pre-Gibbons and post-Gibbons opinions of this
Court.
In Gibbons, this Court did not review either the trial
court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or the
voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas. Rather, the
Court, in the context of remanding the case because an attack on
the voluntariness of a guilty plea must first be presented to the
trial court in the form of a motion to withdraw, concluded that
"a statement of the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in
all trial courts in this state is appropriate."
P.2d at 1312.

Gibbons, 740

It then set out the specific requirements for

taking of guilty pleas under rule 11 for the purpose of assisting

The "record as a whole" test was stated in Miller as follows:
[T]he absence of a finding under [rule 11] is
not critical so long as the record as a whole
affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences and of the
rights he was waiving.
718 P.2d at 405.
_«;_

the trial court on remand in determining the validity of the
defendant's pleas.

Ibid.

The Gibbons Court did not even mention

the record as a whole test for determining voluntariness of a
guilty plea, and the reason seems obvious:

the Court was not

reviewing the trial court record to determine the voluntariness
of the defendant's pleas.

Thus, the court of appeals' conclusion

that Gibbons replaced the record as a whole test with a strict
compliance test reads far too much into Gibbons.

The Gibbons

Court simply did not address that issue.
Furthermore, certain language in several post-Gibbons
opinions of this Court strongly suggests that the record as a
whole test was not modified by Gibbons.

For example, in Jolivet

v. Cook, this Court stated:
We first address Jolivet's claim that his
guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary.
Specifically, Jolivet argues that Judge Burns
erred in the taking of his guilty pleas
because he did not make findings that Jolivet
understood the elements of each crime charged
and how those elements related to the facts,
as required by State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d
1309 (Utah 1987), or that Jolivet knew the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences. In fact, Jolivet claims that he
did not know or understand these things when
he entered his pleas.
[Rule 11(5)(d)] requires that before a
trial court accepts a guilty plea, it must
find that the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
he or she is entering the plea. In Gibbons,
this Court stated that in making this
finding, the trial court must ensure that the
defendant understands "the elements of the
crimes charged and the relationship of the
law to the facts." Id. at 1312. In
addition, [rule 11(5)(e)] requires that
before the trial court accepts a guilty plea,
it must find that the defendant knows of the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive

sentences. The record clearly shows that at
the time the guilty pleas were accepted,
Judge Burns did not make the findings
required by [rule 11(5)], i.e., that Jolivet
understood the elements of each crime charged
and how these elements related to the facts
and that Jolivet knew the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences.
However, this Court has held, n[T]he absence
of a finding under [rule 11] is not critical
so long as the record as a whole
affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences and of the
rights he was waiving." State v. Miller, 718
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris,
709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); Warner v.
Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985).
784 P.2d at 1149-50 (footnotes omitted).

In State v. Copeland,

the Court, without citing Gibbons, said:
The United States Supreme Court has said,
"[T]here is no adequate substitute for
demonstrating in the record at the time the
plea is entered the defendant's understanding
of the nature of the charge against him."
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 1173
(emphasis in the original). We think the
most effective way to do this is to have the
defendant state in his own words his
understanding of the offense and the actions
which make him guilty of the offense. By
this statement, the trial court can assure
itself that the defendant is truly submitting
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the
record on appeal will clearly reflect the
defendant's understanding. Although this
method is therefore preferable to others, it
is not absolutely required. The test is
voluntariness. We hold that the record
demonstrates that defendant admitted acts
sufficient to justify his conviction of the
offense to which he pleaded guilty.
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
Although both Jolivet and Copeland involved pre-Gibbons
guilty pleas, this Court did not note or attach any significance
to that fact in either opinion, and, in fact, directly applied

n

Gibbons in Jolivet in concluding that although the trial court
did not strictly comply with rule 11, the record as a whole
demonstrated that Jolivet entered his guilty pleas knowingly and
voluntarily.

Jolivet, 784 P.2d at 1149-51. This seriously

undermines the court of appeals' effort to distinguish Jolivet
and Copeland on the basis that the record as a whole test was
applied in those cases because they involved pre-Gibbons guilty
9

pleas.

Significantly, in State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah

1989), which involved a post-Gibbons guilty plea, this

Court

appeared to apply the record as a whole test in reversing the
3
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw.
Finally, that the record as a whole test represents the
most reasonable standard upon which to assess a post-conviction
attack on the voluntariness of a guilty plea is made clear in the
following passage from State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986):
A final word on the State's Rule 11
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that
was struck, the State has argued, in effect,
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty
It is not clear what significance State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d
670 (Utah 1989) (per curiam), which was issued five days before
Jolivet, has in this inquiry. Unlike Jolivet, Hickman declined
to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons guilty plea on the ground that
Gibbons represented a clear break from the past and would
therefore not be applied retroactively. Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672
n.l. Insofar as Hickman might be read to support the court of
appeals' strict compliance test, it is inconsistent with Jolivet
and should not be followed.
The court of appeals obviously disagrees with this reading of
Smith, having cited it in support of its decision in State v.
Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1990), and
stating directly in State v. Pharris, Case No. 890549-CA, slip
op. at 8 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1990), a case issued after
Gentry, that Smith applied the "strict compliance test
articulated in Gibbons.••

pleas should always be voided when the trial
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well.
This position is shortsighted, for to follow
it would be to sanction a remedy far worse
than the wrong. If we were to hold any
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the
resultant plea, even when the plea is
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would
encourage defendant's, convicted and
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their
convictions for purely tactical reasons,
either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas
corpus long after the fact. We have refused
to overturn convictions upon such challenges
in the past, e.g., State v. Knowles, Utah,
709 P.2d 311 (1985); State v. Morris, Utah,
709 P.2d 310 (1985), [sic] and we find no
reason to encourage such attacks in the
future.
Overturning such convictions—which we
would have to do if we embraced the rationale
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's
concurring opinion—would require the State
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably
long after the challenged guilty pleas were
entered and when the passage of time would
make reprosecution impractical, if not
impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate
result would be to free a number of convicted
persons for nothing more that technical
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary
guilty pleas.
4
717 P.2d at 1301-02 (footnote omitted) . In so ruling, this
4
Most jurisdictions apply a record as a whole test rather than
the strict compliance rule adopted by the court of appeals. See,
e.g., United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1990)
(district court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does
not warrant reversal where defendant's knowledge of rights waived
was otherwise apparent); Wood v. State, 190 Ga.App. 179, 378
S.E.2d 520 (Ga. App. 1989) (where defendant was otherwise
informed of rights waived, harmless error standard is applied to
trial court's failure to comply with rule governing taking of
pleas); People v. Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 448 N.W.2d 781,
783 (Mich. App. 1989) ("record as a whole" demonstrated that plea
was made knowingly and voluntarily); People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d
9, 459 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 1983) (voluntariness of plea determined
by considering all relevant circumstances surrounding it, not by
judge's ritualistic recitation of rights waived).

Court adopted the harmless error rule in assessing rule 11
errors, a rule long recognized by this Court in a variety of
contexts.

See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1989)

(harmless error standard for nonconstitutional error); State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989) ("with respect to
certain constitutional errors, we must place on the State the
burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt").

See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. Evid. 103(a);

Utah R. Civ. P. 61.

Interestingly, the court of appeals, while

attempting to distinguish Kay from the instant case, failed to
recognize this Court's application of the harmless error rule.
This was done even though the State cited the foregoing quoted
language from Kay in its brief.

See State v. Powell; Case No.

900202-CA at 2-3, Br. of Appellee at 10-11.
In sum, a careful reading of Gibbons and this Court's
pre- and post-Gibbons decisions indicates that the court of
appeals erred in holding that Gibbons replaced the record as a
whole test with a strict compliance test. A strict compliance
test is not required either by Gibbons or logic.
Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari because
the court of appeals has rendered a decision on a question of law
which is in conflict with decisions of this Court.
P. 46(b).

Utah R. App.

Insofar as the issue of what standard applies on

review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea is unsettled in
light of Gibbons, certiorari should be granted because the court
of appeals has decided an important question of law which should
be settled by this Court.

Utah R. App. P. 46(d).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State's petition
for certiorari should be granted pursuant to rule 46(b) or (d),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

fC

day of November, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

lis
1DITH S. H. ATHERTON
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to Stephen
R. McCaughey, Attorney for Respondent, 72 East Fourth South,
Suite 330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
1990.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

J °* ** Court
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)
Case No. 900202-CA

v.
Frank Gene Powell,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
(October 24, 1990)

Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Bench.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals the trial court's refusal to allow
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant's guilty plea
to manslaughter was entered on May 20, 1988. He was sentenced
August 2, 1988. On September 29, 1989, defendant moved to set
aside the plea. He claims that he did not understand the
nature and consequence of his plea because his rights under
Rule 11(5), Utah R. Crim. P. were not adequately explained to
him. He also contends that his lack of formal education
precluded an understanding of his plea and the affidavit he
signed.
We have reviewed the entire record with respect to
defendant's entry of his guilty plea, including the transcripts
of the hearings when the plea was entered and, later, when
withdrawal was sought. We have also considered the arguments
of counsel in the partys' brief. Succinctly, defendant argues
that the plea was not entered in compliance with Utah R. Crim.
P. 11(5); State vt Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987); and
State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988). Sfifi
AlJ5£, State vt PharriS, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 36-7 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990); State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990); and State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Both parties are well acquainted with the facts
surrounding the entry of the plea. A detailed recitation of
those relevant facts here is unnecessary. It is sufficient to

observe that the State continues to disagree with this court's
implementation of Rule 11(5) and State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d at
1312-13. We follow our rejection of a "record as a whole"
approach, as we have discussed in the previously cited cases.
We find that the trial court's acceptance of defendant's guilty
plea failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Rule

11(5) and with State vt Gibbons.
Although in this case the trial court's examination of
defendant at the time his guilty plea was entered was more
lengthy than the examination in State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d at
1334, that questioning was not sufficiently detailed regarding
defendant's understanding of his specific Rule 11(5) rights.
The trial court failed to review with defendant both his
statements in the affidavit and the rights enumerated in Rule
11(5). Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314. As we stated in State v.
Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37, the failure to make any
inquiry as to the specific rights detailed in Rule 11(5) cannot
be "cured" by their mere inclusion in an affidavit alone.
Consequently, the inadequate examination of defendant was plain
error. Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241-2 (1969).
We are mindful of the State's arguments and of the trial
court's comments on the record regarding their concerns as to
the practical consequences that a strict application of Rule
11(5) and State v. Gibbons require. VasilaCQPUlPS/ 776 P.2d at
1334.
"The procedure may take additional time, but
constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in the name of
judicial economy." Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1314. We will
continue to adhere to the above established precedent, until
such time as the Utah Supreme Court determines otherwise.
The state also argues that State v. Kay. 717 P.2d 1294,
1301-2 (Utah 1986) holds that a rule 11 error does not
invalidate a plea unless the error resulted in a "substantial"
violation of a party's right and that this pre-Gibbons holding
was not expressly overruled by Gibbons. We reject any notion
that Kay is "controlling" authority here. Kay involved a
challenge to portions of Rule 11 that are not at issue here —
namely a trial judge's participation in and adherence to a plea
bargain agreement between the state and an accused. 1£. at
1296.
That case did not involve the validity of a waiver of
the substantial rights secured to an accused by statute and
constitution. In Kay, the state, and not the accused, argued
that a trial court's technical violation of Rule 11 would
invalidate a conditional plea bargain arrangement. i£. at
1300.
Also, we do not view State v. Gibbons to be inharmonious

with State v. Kay because an uninformed and unknowing waiver of
defendant's constitutional rights would be a ••substantial"
violation under Kav. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-3; Accord
Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 242-4 (An accused's right to
trial by jury, right to confrontation, and against
self-incrimination are "important" constitutional rights and
their waiver must be knowing, intelligent and on the record).
Denial of defendant's motion to set aside his guilty plea
is reversed. The case is remanded to allow defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea and, if appropriate, proceed to trial.
ALL CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

Grego

Orme, Judge

j2U}£>Ct tO*t£b>*As
R u s s e l l W. Bench, Judge

